3 posts tagged with "Security"

An agent fixing a failing test needs to read code, install dependencies, and run commands. It probably does not need your SSH keys, access to another client's repository, or a connection to a production database. Yet a terminal running under your account may expose all three.

The question is not whether you trust the model to be helpful. It is whether the environment limits the consequences when the model, a dependency, or an instruction it encounters is wrong.

Sandbox the execution, not just the conversation. GitHub Copilot and Docker both offer sandboxing, but the boundaries are different. They can also work together.

Picture this. A GitHub Copilot coding agent picks up an issue, creates a branch, writes the implementation across four files, adds tests, and opens a pull request. CI passes. Code scanning reports no alerts. A developer reviews the diff, approves, and merges. The change ships to production through an automated deployment pipeline.

Three weeks later, a penetration test discovers that the agent-generated code introduced a server-side request forgery vulnerability. The code was syntactically clean, the tests covered the happy path, and the reviewer did not catch the flaw because the logic looked reasonable in isolation. Now the team needs to answer a question that their security model was never designed for: who is accountable for code that no human wrote?

In this post I am sharing some tips about GitHub to celebrate "GitHub de Mayo". I hope you find these tips useful: